Two Perspectives on Structuring Discretion: Justices Stewart and White on the Death Penalty by Palmer, Larry I.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1979
Two Perspectives on Structuring Discretion:
Justices Stewart and White on the Death Penalty
Larry I. Palmer
William & Mary Law School
Copyright c 1979 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Palmer, Larry I., "Two Perspectives on Structuring Discretion: Justices Stewart and White on the Death Penalty" (1979). Faculty
Publications. Paper 522.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/522
9901-4169/79/7002-0194S02.00/0 
THE JouRNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 
Copyright© 1979 by Nonhwestern University School of Law 
Vol. 70,No. 2 
Printtd in U.S.A. 
TWO PERSPECTIVES ON STRUCTURING DISCRETION: JUSTICES STEWART 
AND WHITE ON THE DEATH PENALTY 
LARRY I. PALMER• 
INTRODUCTION 
In Furman v. Georgia, 1 both Justices Stewart and 
White joined the majority of the United States 
Supreme Court in holding discretionary death pen-
alty statutes unconstitutional. In their separate 
concurring opinions, each Justice indicated that 
some methods of imposing the death penalty might 
be constitutional, even though discretionary im-
position of the death penalty was not.2 After Fur-
man, both Justices Stewart and White agreed that 
statutes providing for the imposition of the death 
penalty in accordal\ce with certain "standards" 
were constitutional.3 They disagreed, however, over 
whether "mandatory" death penalty statutes were 
constitutional means of imposing death. Justice 
Stewart joined the Court's majority in declaring 
two slightly different mandatory death penalty 
statutes unconstitutional.4 But, Justice White dis-
sented in each of these cases maintaining that 
mandatory death penalty statutes are constitu-
tionaL 5 In essence, fundamental theoretical differ-
ences led each Justice to frame the issues differently 
in death penalty cases and accounted for the di-
verse outcomes. These fundamental differences are 
• Part of the research done in conjunction with this 
article was supported by a grant from the Ford Founda-
tion. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are 
those of the author and do not reflect the opinions or 
conclusions of the Ford Foundation. Mr. Palmer is Pro-
fessor of Law, Cornell University; A.B., 1966, Harvard 
College; LL.B., 1969, Yale University. 
I 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
2 /d. at 310 (Stewart,]., concurring); id. at 314 (White, 
J., concurring). 
3 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality 
opinion by Justice Stewart); id. at 207 (White, J., con-
curring); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plural-
ity opinion by Justice Powell in which Justice Stewart 
joined); id. at 260 (White, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality 
opinion by Justice Stevens in which Justice Stewart 
joined); id. at 278 (White,J., concurring). 
4 Su Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) 
(plurality opinion by Justice Stewart); Roberts v. Louis-
iana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion by Justice 
Stevens in which Justice Stewart joined). 
5 428 U.S. at 306 (White, J., dissenting); 428 U.S. at 
363 (White, J., dissenting). 
never fully articulated in the opinions, but none-
theless are of far ranging significance not only in 
capital cases, but in the criminal law in generaL 
This article illustrates that Justice Stewart's 
"punishment" theory relies heavily upon proce-
dural devices to individualize the decision of im-
posing the death penalty. Under his theory, appel-
late courts must occupy a key policy-making role 
for a statute to meet the minimal requirements of 
the Constitution. Justice Stewart believes that un-
der the Constitution, legislatures must pursue con-
flicting goals in drafting death penalty legislation. 
A death penalty must further retribution and gen-
eral deterrence on the one hand, rehabilitation and 
reform on the other. For Stewart, the only solution 
is to adopt procedures which leave to the courts the 
responsibility of weighing these conflicting goals in 
individual cases. Thus, Justice Stewart's analysis 
relies upon his interpretation of the Due Process 
Clause of the fourteenth amendment and on the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. 
By contrast, Justice White's analysis focuses en-
tirely on the eighth amendment. He is concerned 
primarily with the necessity for clearly articulated 
standards of culpability. For White, general deter-
rence is a sufficient goal for death penalty statutes 
and the issue is whether the state has identified 
who deserves to die with sufficient particularity to 
further this goaL Under this theory of "responsi-
bility," there is little need for special procedural 
devices. 
Both theories aim at the same substantive re-
sult-that only those who legitimately deserve to 
die are sentenced to death. In this sense, both theo-
ries are concerned with "individualizing" death 
penalty decisionmaking. But differences as to the 
constitutional s/urce of this requirement and con-
sequently as 1tO the constitutionally mam.aated 
method of ac~ieving this end, lead to contradictory 
results as·in the mandatory death penalty cases. 
Part I of this article develops the two theories 
through analysis of the Justices' positions in Furman 
and its major progeny in 1976.6 Part II deals with 
6 See_ notes 3-5 supra. 
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post-1976 death penalty litigation. In only one 
case7 have Stewart and White been in complete 
agreement in their method of analysis. Rather than 
undermining the thesis of this article, this single 
point of convergence illustrates that concepts of 
"punishment" and "responsibility" have points in 
common in legal decisionmaking since the concepts 
are, in law as well as in common parlance, inter-
related.8 
Part III concludes the article by examining the 
implications of the two constitutional theories for 
future death penalty litigation and other sentenc-
ing issues. Even if the Court never actively enters 
the current debate over the sentencing process, the 
perspectives of Justices Stewart and White on how 
death should be imposed make a contribution to 
debate about our current sentencing practices. This 
article illustrates that the constitutional theories of 
Justices Stewart and White are differing normative 
perspectives on how the component parts of the 
criminal proc;ess ought to operate as a "system."9 
7 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality 
opinion by Justice White in which Justice Stewart 
joined). Coker held the imposition of the death penalty 
unconstitutional for rape of an adult woman. Id. at 592. 
8 The terminology of legal philosphers, "punishment 
and responsibility," is used to label the constitutional 
models of both Justice White and Justice Stewart. By 
using these labels, it is not meant to imply that their 
models correspond precisely with notions of punishment 
and responsibility used by a particular philosopher. See 
generally H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 
(1968). Punishment and responsibility are concepts whose 
interrelationship deserves to be treated at length in books, 
not footnotes. See E. PINCOFFS, THE RATIONALE OF LEGAL 
PUNISHMENT (1966). See also j. FEINBERG, DoiNG & DE-
SERVING: EssAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY (1970). 
As labels, punishment and responsibility are descriptive 
of the complex moral problems that the Justices are 
trying to solve in the death penalty litigation. Further, 
use of the terminology alerts us that the problems facing 
legal decision makers in this area are replete with con-
cepts that are changing over time. &e Lasswell & Don-
nelly, The Continuing Debate over. Responsibility: An Introduc-
tion to Isolating the Condemnation Sanction, 68 YALE L. J. 869 
(1959). 
Since the two constructs are so often interwoven, it 
appears more appropriate in actual legal decision-making 
to focus on issues of adjudication or criminal liability and 
issues of disposition, to decide what to do with persons 
legally subject to state control. See generally Palmer, A 
Model of Criminal Disposition: An Alternative to Official Dis-
cretion in Sentencing, 62 GEo. L. J. 1 (1973). 
. 
9 For a general discussion of the development of sys-
tematic views of the criminal process, see Goldstein, 
Reflections On Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American 
Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1009, 1014-15 (1974). 
For a critique of the "systems view" of the criminal 
process, see, THE RULE OF LAw: AN ALTERNATIVE TO 
VIOLENCE; A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL CoMMISSION ON 
I. FURMAN AND THE 1976 DEATH PENALTY 
LITIGATION 
In separate opinions, Justices Stewart and White 
joined the per curiam opinion declaring the ad-
ministration of the death penalty unconstitutional 
in the three cases before the Court in Furman v. 
Georgia. 10 In those cases, the death penalty had 
been imposed for the crimes of rape and murder 
under the then prevailing legislative schemes that 
gave discretion to judges and juries to withhold or 
impose the death penalty.11 Justice Stewart rea-
soned that the eighth and fourteenth amendments 
invalidated the imposition of the death penalty 
under "legal systems that permit this unique pen-
alty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed. " 12 
Justice White, apparently relying solely upon the 
eighth amendment, reasoned that under the legis-
lative schemes at issue the death penalty made only 
a marginal contribution to the deterrence of 
crime.13 In his view, the legislative policy of allow-
ing the jury to bring the "community judgment" 
to bear on sentence, as well as on guilt or innocence, 
had the practical effect of eliminating the rationale 
of the death penalty since legislative policy was not 
frustrated even if the death penalty were withheld 
for the most atrocious crimes.14 
In their relatively short concurring opinions, 
both Justices distinguished their positions from 
those of the other three concurring Justices. In 
separate opinions and for different reasons, Justices 
Brennan and Marshall had found the infliction of 
the death penalty unconstitutional under all cir-
cumstances.15 Justice Douglas had found the im-
position of the death penalty unconstitutional be-
cause the record proved that the penalty had been 
inflicted against racial and other minority grours 
LAw: AN ALTERNATIVE TO VIOLENCE at 265-69 (1970). 
10 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Court considered two cases 
from Georgia and one from Texas. In the Georgia cases, 
one defendant had been convicted of murder and the 
other of rape. They had both been sentenced to death. In 
the Texas case, the defendant had been convicted of rape 
and sentenced to death. /d. 
11 See, e.g., GA. CoDE ANN. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971); 
TEX. PENAL CoDE ANN. art. 1189 (1961). 
12 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
13 /d. at 312-13 (White,J., concurring). 
14 /d. at 313. 
15 /d. at 305 (Brennan,]., concurring); id. at 370 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring). Both Justices have continued to 
adhere to their views throughout the Court's death pen-
alty litigation. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
230-31 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231 (Mar-
shall, J ., dissenting). 
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in an impermissible manner. 16 Both Justices Stew-
art and White, however, indicated that the death 
penalty could be imposed in some circumstances. 
Although Justice Stewart made reference to Jus-
tice White's opinion/7 neither Justice analyzed 
their differences in approach. As already stated, 
Justice White relied solely upon the eighth amend-
ment,18 while Justice Stewart relied upon both the 
eighth amendment and the fourteenth amend-
ment's Due Process Clause.19 The Justices also 
differed as to what goals legislatures might legiti-
mately pursue in death penalty schemes. In White's 
opinion, general deterrence could not only be a 
legitimate goal in using the death penalty, but 
could be labeled a '"moral" goal as well.20 On the 
other hand, Justice Stewart indicated that a legis-
lature may pursue both retribution and deterrence. 
According to Stewart, the state's pursuit of these 
goals had to be balanced against another impor-
tant constitutional interest-the rehabilitation or 
reform of the offender-and it was the court's duty 
to strike this balance.21 
A. Furman's Progeny 
Five years after Furman, the Court decided five 
death penalty cases in which the differences be-
tween Justices Stewart and White became even 
more pronounced. Justice Stewart joined the three-
man plurality in all five cases. He authored the 
plurality opinion in Gregg v. Georgia,22 upholding a 
death penalty statute with constitutionally ade-
quate "standards." He joined the plurality opin-
ions upholding other statutes with similar stan-
dards in Proffitt v. Floridaz:J and Jurek v. Texas. 24 
Justice Stewart also authored the plurality opinion 
declaring North Carolina's mandatory death pen-
alty statute unconstitutional in Woodson v. North 
Carolina.25 Finally, he joined the plurality's invali-
dation of Louisiana's mandatory death penalty 
statute in Roberts v. Louisiana.26 
Justice White wrote dissenting opinions in both 
Woodson and Roberts because he believed that a 
mandatory death penalty statute could be consti-
tutional if it contained appropriate standards to 
16 
•108 U.S. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
17 /d. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurrmg). 
18 /d. at 311 (White, J., concurring). 
19 /d. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
20 /d. at 312 (White,J., concurring). 
21 !d. at 307 (Stewart,J., concurring). 
22 428 u.s. 153 (1976). 
23 428 u.s. 242 (1976). 
24 428 u.s. 262 (1976). 
25 428 u.s. 280 (1976). 
26 428 u.s. 325 (1976). 
determine culpability.27 Although he joined the 
plurality in Gregg, Proffitt and Jurek in upholding 
those statutes, Justice White's concurring opinions 
in all three of these cases expressed disagreement 
with the reasoning of the plurality.28 In White's 
view, none of these newly enacted statutes suffered 
from constitutional pitfalls like the statute in Fur-
man. But, only three of those legislatures had man-
aged to meet Justice Stewart's requirements that a 
death penalty statute contain both "standards" 
and flexibility in order to be constitutional. 
justice Stewart's Punishment Theory 
Justice Stewart's opinions and voting patterns 
establish two closely related minimum criteria for 
a constitutional death penalty statute. First, a stat-
ute had to provide distinct proceedings for the 
determination of guilt or innocence and the deci-
sion to impose the death penalty or a lesser penalty. 
In Gregg, Justice Stewart thus upheld a statute that 
required a separate penalty hearing before judge 
and jury after a judgment that the offender had 
committed first degree murder. Under the Georgia 
statute at issue there, the judge was required to 
impose the jury's recommended sentence.29 In Prof-
fitt, the second case, Justice Stewart joined Justice 
Powell's plurality opinion upholding a Florida 
statute similar to Georgia's statute. In contrast to 
the Georgia statute, however, the Florida scheme 
permitted the trial judge to reject or accept the 
jury's recommendations on sentence since its role 
in the separate sentencing proceeding was merely 
advisory.30 The Texas statute upheld by the same 
plurality in an opinion by Justice Stevens injurek 
was a variation on the Florida and Georgia statutes. 
As in the Georgia statute, the jury had ultimate 
authority to impose the death penalty. But unlike 
either the Florida or Georgia statutes, the Texas 
statute did not contain a list of "aggravating cir-
cumstances," although it did require the jury to 
answer three questions about the offender and his 
crime before the death penalty could be imposed.31 
Justice Stewart's second minimal condition for 
the constitutionality of death penalty statutes was 
the requirement of appellate review of the decision 
to impose death. All three statutory schemes under 
27 428 U.S. at 306 (White, J., dissenting); 428 U.S. at 
363 (White, J., dissenting). 
28 428 U.S. at 207 (White, J., concurring); 428 U.S. at 
260 (White, J., concurring); 428 U.S. at 277 (White, J., 
concurring). 
29 GA. CoDE ANN.§§ 26-3102, 27-2514 (Supp. 1975). 
30 FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 921.141 (West Supp. 1976-1977). 
31 TEx. CoDE CR!M. Paoc. ANN. an. 37.071 (Vernon 
Supp. 1975-1976). 
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.:onsideration provided for some form of appellate · 
review and approval of the imposition of the death 
penalty on any given individual. For example, 
Georgia's highest court was required to review the 
jury's decision on death to determine if three gen-
eral standards had been met.32 Moreover, the Flor-
ida statute required automatic appellate review in 
all cases where the death sentence was imposed, 
but, unlike the Georgia statute, it lacked specific 
criteria for the court to apply.33 Justice Powell's 
opinion in Proffitt relied upon tl),e fact that the trial 
judge, who had ultimate sentencing authority, was 
required to state his reasons for imposing the death 
penalty. Because of this requirement, Justice Pow-
ell reasoned that the appellate court could engage 
in meaningful review of the decision.34 Finally, the 
Texas statute, like the Georgia statute, required 
expedited appeal of any death sentence, but did 
not formulate standards of review.35 Justice Ste-
vens' opinion injurek took the view that the high 
court in Texas had interpreted the legislative 
scheme so that the jury's answer to the three ques-
tions required it to consider the same aggravating 
and mitigating factors as the Florida statute.36 
In the plurality's view, all three state high courts 
had assumed the role of ultimate supervisor of the 
administration of the death penalty.37 Justice Stew-
art believed that this ensured the structuring of the 
decision in accordance with legislative standards.36 
32 The Georgia statute reads in part: 
(c) With regard to the sentence, the court shall 
determine: 
(I) Whether the sentence of death was imposed 
under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any 
other arbitrary factor, and 
(2) Whether, in cases other than treason or air-
craft hijacking, the evidence supports the jury's or 
judge's finding of a statutory aggravating circum-
stance as enumerated in section 27.2534.1(b), and 
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar 
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. 
GA. ConE ANN.§ 27-3537 (Supp. 1975). 
33 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4) {West Supp. 1976-
i977). 
34 428 U.S. at 250-53 (plurality opinion by Justice 
Powell). 
35 TEX. ConE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 
Supp. 1975-1976). 
36 428 U.S. ·at 270-74 (plurality opinion by Justice 
Stevens). 
37 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 204-06 (plurality 
opinion by Justice Stewart); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 
at 253 (plurality opinion by Justice Powell); Jurek v. 
Texas, 428 U.S. at 273-74 (plurality opinion by Justice 
Stevens). 
:JS Justice Stewart's opinion in Gregg did not explicitly 
require appellate review of the decision to impose death. 
However, he did state that "to guard against a situation 
comparable to that presented in Furman, the Supreme 
His opinion in Gregg referred to the fact that state 
appellate courts had functioned as ultimate arbiter 
of the death penalties actually imposed and had 
invalidated the death penalty for some crimes.39 
Appellate review of the Florida, Texas and Georgia 
statutes then, had cured the "arbitrariness" and 
"freakishness" of the statutes that Justice Stewart 
had condemned in Furman. 
On the other hand, mandatory death penalties 
failed to meet Justice Stewart's test of minimal 
standards. In Woodson v. North Caro/ina,40 Stewart's 
plurality opinion held unconstitutional a statute 
requiring the impo~ition of the death penalty in 
every case of murder.41 According to Stewart, the 
underlying purpose of the two criteria established 
in Gregg, Proffitt and Jurek, insuring structured "in-
dividualization" of the death penalty decision, 
could not be met by a statutory scheme that did 
not provide for bifurcated proceedings.42 Without 
providing appellate review of the death penalty as 
a separate and distinct issue, the North Carolina 
statute in Woodson was thus held by Stewart to be 
lacking in "objective standards."43 
In Roberts v. Louisiana," Stewart joined Justice 
Stevens' plurality opinion which invalidated a 
mandatory death penalty for murder despite the 
changes in adjudicatory aspects of murder designed 
to guide the jury's determination of murder. Be-
cause death was automatic upon finding of first 
degree murder, the statute mandated that the jury 
must be instructed on all "lesser included offenses" 
in every unlawful homicide prosecution, regardless 
of the defendant's request or the evidence. The 
Louisiana statute also required the jury to return 
a "responsive verdict" as to which form of homicide 
it had found.45 Justice Stevens believed that this 
Court of Georgia compares each death sentence with the 
sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants to 
insure that the sentence of death in a particular case is 
not disproportionate." 428 U.S. at 198. Thus, if Justice 
Stewart's opinion in Gregg is read in light of his opinion 
in Furman, the failure of the state to provide for appellate 
review would mean every case would present a constitu-
tional issue of "arbitrariness" for some federal court. In 
addition, since Justice Stewart's theory holds most man-
datory schemes unconstitutional, the state's choices of 
methods for imposing death withour federal review must 
include some form of appellate review. 
39 428 U.S. at 203, 205-06 (plurality opinion by Justice 
Stewart). 
40 428 u.s. 280 (1976). 
41 N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 14-17 (1976). 
42 428 U.S. at 303-05 (plurality opinion by Justice 
Stewart). 
43 !d. at 303. 
"428 u.s. 325 (1976). 
.c5 428 U.S. at 332 (plurality opinion by Justice Ste-
vens). 
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type of adjudication interfered with the constitu-
tional policy of individualization.46 Removing all 
sentencing authority regarding the death penalty 
from a jury or trial judge was not considered as 
curative of the Furman defects. As Stevens noted, 
the Constitution requires, at least for the imposition 
of the death penalty, a proceeding distinct from 
the determination of guilt. 
In essence, Justice Stewart's constitutional the-
ory requires a legislature to make a considered 
choice about the procedures for imposing the death 
penalty. If it decides that the death penalty is a 
necessary part of the criminal process, the legisla-
ture must be willing to expend the society's re-
sources on the resolution of each and every case 
where the state seeks to impose the death penalty. 
Every accused offender must have not only the 
opportunity to defend against the finding of "cap-
ital murder," but also an opportunity to be heard 
on whether the death sentence should be imposed 
on him both at the trial and appellate levels. Thus, 
appellate courts occupy an important policy-mak-
ing role under Justice Stewart's view. 
Justice Stewart's theory is considered a theory of 
"punishment" because it focuses on the methods of 
imposing the death penalty. This theory requires 
that those methods further not only the goals of 
retribution or deterrence, but also the goal of "in-
dividualization." In determining whether a statu-
tory scheme provides sufficient "individualization" 
of the sanction of death, Justice Stewart assumes 
that the sentencing stage is the appropriate point 
for individualization of the decision rather than 
the process of_determining guilt.47 
Justice White's "Responsibility" Theory 
Taking a different viewpoint from Stewart, Jus-
tice White dissented from the invalidation of the 
Louisiana and North Carolina mandatory death 
penalty statutes. In Roberts, Justice White reasoned 
that the Louisiana mandatory death statute was 
constitutional because the legislature had removed 
the jury's discretion to bring in the verdict of 
"guilty without capital punishment" for the crime 
of first-degree murder.46 This legislative change 
cured the major defect that White had seen in the 
Furman statute: it eliminated the potential for dis-
•s /d. at 335-36. 
47 As will be discussed later, Justice Stewart's theory in 
the second round of death penalty litigation is part of his 
more general theory of the meaning of the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause. His theory of that clause 
focuses primarily on the decision to impose the sanction 
rather than the requirements of criminal liability. See text 
accompanying notes 181-200 infra. 
48 428 U.S. at 346-50 (White, J., dissenting). 
criminatory and arbitrary infliction of the death 
penalty. Since the North Carolina legislature had 
also eliminated this traditional aspect of jury dis-
cretion in the administration of the death penalty, 
Justice White:s dissenting opinion in Woodson was 
essentially a cross reference to his dissent in Rob-
erts.49 Thus, both of his dissents rejected the linch-
pin of Justice Stewart's anatysis that a separation 
of guilt determination and the penalty infliction 
process is a precondition to a death penalty stat-
ute's constitutionality. 
In concurring opinions, Justice White agreed 
with the plurality that the Georgia, Florida and 
Texas legislatures had chosen constitutionally per-
missible means of eliminating "wanton" and 
"freakish" imposition of the death penalty. In 
Gregg, White found the Georgia statute constitu-
tional because the appellate court had exercised 
the authority granted to it by the legislature to 
review the infliction of the death penalty in the 
cases before the Court. 50 Similarly, White's concur-
rence in Proffitt argued that the Florida statute 
required the trial judge to impose the death penalty 
on all first degree murders meeting the statutory 
standards. He thus interpreted the Florida statute 
as "mandating" the death penalty. 51 Furthermore, 
in Jurek, White interpreted the Texas statute as 
requiring the imposition of the death penalty if the 
jury answered two of the three statutory questions 
affirmatively.52 
Once adequate standards had been set, it was 
not relevant under White's theory whether the 
standards were applied by a jury, a trial judge or 
an appellate court. The setting of clear standards 
thus cured the Furman defects. For White, the es-
sential problem for the Court was to determine if 
the state's system of decisionmaking can distinguish 
those murderers who deserve death from those who 
deserve a lesser punishment. The problem has two 
dimensions. First, Justice White looked for evidence 
that the legislature had established standards in 
sufficient detail describing the circumstances in 
which an offender is liable for the death penalty. 
All five statutes met this threshold requirement. 
For instance, affirmative answers to the following 
two questions: 
(1) Whether the conduct of the defendant that 
caused the death of the deceased was committed 
deliberately and with reasonable expectation that 
death of the deceased or another would result; 
•• 428 U.S. at 306-07 (White, J., dissenting). 
50 428 U.S. at 222-24 (White, J., concurring). 
51 428 U.S. at 260 (White, J., concurring). 
52 428 U.S. at 277-78 (White, J., concurring). 
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(2) Whether there is a probability that the defendant 
would commit criminal acts of violence that would 
constitute a continuing threat to society;63 
would focus sufficiently on the offender's character 
and his crime to convince Justice White that any 
person so selected has committed an atrocity, pun-
ishable by death.54 
Second, Justice White sought to determine if 
those designated to apply the standards were ca-
pable of doing so. In his view, a jury was capable 
of applying standards because of the "common 
sense core meaning" of the questions in the Texas 
statute.55 Similarily, in the Louisiana case, Justice 
White suggested that the "lesser included offense 
provisions" criticized by the plurality56 would not 
interfere with the jury's role as the conscience of 
the community in criminal cases.57 In the Florida 
case, White asserted that the trial judge's sentenc-
ing, according to statutory provisions of aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors, would lead to regular, 
as opposed to freakish, imposition of the death 
penalty. As a result, in his view, the death penalty 
remained a credible deterrent to crime58 because 
trial judges and juries could be expected to perform 
t~eir furic.tion of applying definite standards. As a 
consequence of his confidence in appellate courts, 
Justice White simply reviewed the record in Gregg 
to determine if the state court had performed its 
statutorily assigned task of eliminating cases of 
discriminatory or arbitrary infliction of the death 
penalty. After these constitutionally impermissible 
factors were eliminated, Justice White assumed 
that the jury had found that the offender deserved 
the death penalty after weighing statutorily iden-
tified mitig~ti?g and aggravating circumstances.59 
Justice White's analysis is labeled a theory of 
"criminal responsibility," despite the confusion en-
gendered by the term,60 because his focus requires 
the Court to balance social interest against the 
individual offender's interest in his life. White's 
overall analysis is concerned primarily with 
whether those who should die as a result of their 
crime are condemned. He is more concerned that 
these persons· are condemned than with whether 
the system makes a "mistake" and condemns a 
53 !d. at 277. 
54 !d. at 279. 
55 TEX. CooE CRtM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071 (b) (Vernon 
Supp. 1975-1976). 
r.s Robats, 428 U.S. at 334-35 (plurality opinion by 
Justice Stevens). 
s7 !d. at 347-48. (White,J., dissenting). 
r.s Profitt, 428 U.S. at 260-61. (White,J., concurring). 
59 428 U.S. at 224 (White, J., concurring). 
60 See Lasswell & Donnelly, supra note 8, at 875. 
murderer who does not deserve the penalty. In his 
analysis, the decision to condemn a murderer to 
die is a collective decision of legislatures and the 
administrators of the criminal process-prosecu-
tors, juries, trial judges, probation officials, etc. 
Justice White's theory does not assume, as does 
Justice Stewart's theory, that the Court's role is to 
impose particular procedures for administering the 
death penalty. Rather, in White's view, the Court's 
primary duty is to assess the overall system of 
decisionmaking to determine whether minimal 
criteria of criminal responsibility are met. Justice 
White's opinion in Furman and the second round of 
litigation over the death penalty indicates that the 
constitutionality of death penalty legislation is de-
pendent upon the capacity of the criminal law 
process to effect a legislative mandate that the 
death penalty is a necessary part of the criminal 
justice system.61 
B. Interpretations of Pre-Furman Precedents 
In the second round of death penalty litigation, 
both Justices indicated that the Court's 1971 opin-
ion in McGautha v. Califomia,62 in which they had 
both joined, offered support for their respective 
theories. McGautha upheld the constitutionality of 
the type of discretionary death penalty statutes 
under the fourteenth amendment63 that Furman 
condemned as unconstitutional under the eighth 
and fourteenth amendments a year later. The dif-
fering interpretations of McGautha held by Justices 
Stewart and White illustrate their fundamental 
disagreement as to the requirements of the eighth 
amendment's' Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause and the fourteenth amendment's Due Proc-
ess Clause. An examination of the Court's two pre-
McGautha procedural due process cases involving 
the death penalty64 reveals the fundamental differ-
ence as to how each Justice defines due process in 
a way that McGautha masks. Examination of the 
two non-death penalty eighth amendment cases55 
61 As developed later, Justice White held these statutes 
that do not meet his minimal standards of criminal 
responsibility in the manner in which "capital murder" 
is defined unconstitutional on that ground alone. See 
Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2981 (1978) (White, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). See text accom-
panying notes 192-99 infra. 
62 402 u.s. 183 (1971). 
63 /d. at 196. 
64 United States v.Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968); With-
erspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). See text accom-
panying notes 88-109 infra . 
• 
65 Compare Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) 
with Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). See text 
accompanying notes 110-64 infra. 
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reveals a similar disagreement on the perimeters of 
the eighth amendment. 
Differing Views of McGautha 
In the Louisiana mandatory death penalty case, 
Justice White cited McGautha as support for his 
basic theory.66 In McGautha, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of statutes that allowed juries to 
impose the death penalty without any legislative 
standards setting permissible considerations for the 
making of that determination.67 .In a companion 
case, the Court also upheld the constitutionality of 
statutes that allowed juries to determine in one 
proceeding whether the defendant was guilty and 
whether the death penalty or life imprisonment 
should be imposed.68 For Justice White, McGautha 
stood for the proposition that the Due Process 
Clause does not require bifurcation of trial and 
death penalty proceedings. 69 If bifurcation is the 
cornerstone of Justice Stewart's procedural analy-
sis, Justice White's view of McGautha thus renders 
the case inconsistent with Justice Stewart's punish-
ment theory. 
Justice Stewart's opinion in Woodson, declaring 
mandatory death penalty unconstitutional, how-
ever, cited McGautha with approva1.70 There was 
nothing in any of his opinions indicating a sub 
silentio disapproval of McGautha. Nor did Justice 
Stewart indicate that he saw any fundamental 
conflict between his participation in the Court's 
opinion in McGautha and his plurality opinions in 
Gregg and Woodson. 71 
Justice Stewart's failure to perceive this conflict 
can be explained in terms of one of the key concepts 
66 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 350-58 (1976) 
(W-hite, J., dissenting). 
67 402 u.s. 183, 196 (1971). 
68 The Ohio procedure which permitted the guilt and 
punishment determination to be made in a single unitary 
proceeding, id. at 192, was also upheld as constitutional. 
/d. at 196. 
69 See note 66 supra. 
70 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 297-98 
(1976) (plurality opinion by Justice Stewart) (where 
McGautha is used to demonstrate the nation's rejection of 
mandatory death penalty schemes). 
71 I~ a long footnote in Gugg, Justice Stewart does 
state: 
While Furman did not overrule McGautha, it is clearly 
in a substantial tension with a broad reading of 
McGautha s holding. In view of Furman, McGautha 
can be viewed rationally as a precedent only for the 
proposition that standardless jury sentencing pro-
cedures were not employed in the cases there before 
the Court so as to violate the Due Process Clause. 
42!s u.::.. at 195-96 n.47. 
in his constitutional theory of punishment. In con-
trast to traditional analysis that asserts punishment 
is a legislative function,72 Justice Stewart's theory 
maintains that both appellate courts and legisla-
tures are key policy makers in the administration 
. 73 
of the death penalty. Once this fundamental 
premise of Justice Stewart's theory is adopted, 
McGautha is not inconsistent with his reasoning in 
Gregg or Woodson. The petitioners in McGautha had 
argued that legislatures are required by the four-
teenth amendment to impose standards for jury 
death penalty decisionmaking.74 Justice Stewart's 
response to that argument based solely on the Due 
Process Clause was to join Justice Harlan's major-
ity opinion in McGautha, rejecting the requirement 
on legislatures. Justice Stewart's constitutional the-
ory of death penalty decisionmaking would have 
required the petitioners in McGautha to argue that 
appellate courts must supervise the legislative stan-
dards used by juries to impose the death penalty 
under the eighth and fourteenth amendments.75 
The argument was unavailable since the petition 
for certiorari in McGautha had limited consideration 
of the issues solely to the Due Process Clause.76 
To make McGautha consistent with Justice Stew-
72 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 405 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) where justice Blackmun expressed 
the view of who can determine punishment under the 
eighth amendment, in rather graphic terms: "Were I a 
legislator, I would vote against the death penalty for the 
policy reasons argued by counsel for the respective peti-
tioners .... " /d. at 406. 
Later in the opinion, he stated: 
I do not sit on these cases, however, as a legislator, 
responsive, at least in part, to the will of constitu-
ents. Our task here, as must so frequently be em-
phasized and re-emphasized, is to pass upon the 
constitutionality oflegislation that has been enacted 
and that is challenged. This is the sole task for 
judges. 
/d. at 410-11. 
73 See text accompanying notes 29-47 supra. 
74 See Brief for Petitioner, at 17-19, McGautha v. 
California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
75 In the same footnote in Gugg, Justice Stewart went 
on to say: 
We note that McGautha's assumption that it is 
not possible to devise standards to guide and regu-
larize jury sentencing in capital cases has been 
undermined by subsequent experience. In view of 
that experience and the considerations set forth in 
the text, we adhere to Furman'S determination that 
where the ultimate punishment of death is at issue 
a system of standardless jury discretion violates the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
428 U.S. at 195-96 n.47. 
76 398 u.s. 936 (1970). 
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art's more fully developed constitutional theory of 
punishment, it should be intepreted as supporting 
this particularly narrow proposition: .For the death 
penalty to be constitutionally imposed under both 
the Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punish· 
ment Clauses, appellate review of the decision to 
impose death must be part of the decisionmaking 
process. Although a statute without specific legis-
lative standards for appellate courts to apply in 
deciding whether to impose death may be consti-
tutional as in Jurek, Justice Stewart would permit 
only those death penalty schemes where appellate 
courts assume the role of supervising the standards 
for imposing death to be constitutional.77 Stewart 
believed that appellate court supervision of legis-
lative standards is in fact a necessary condition to 
the constitutionality of death penalty statutes. His 
analysis in Gregg and Woodson thus furthered what 
he perceived as the underlying goal of McGautha-
individualization of punishment-by requiring 
procedures that ensure such individualized deci-
sionmaking. 
Justice White saw McGautha as defining the basic 
goals which the Consititution allows the state to 
seek in authorizing the death penalty. For him, 
McGautha did not alter what he referred to as an 
"axiom" of constitutional law: Some crimes are so 
serious that the legislature may exclude considera-
tion of the character of the individual offender in 
deciding whether to impose the death penalty.78 
Justice White's axiom is explicitly derived from the 
Due Process Clause since McGautha was decided 
solely under the fourteenth amendment. As he 
asserted in his dissent in Roberts, even if the goal of 
Justice Stewart's theory-individualization-is re-
quired by the eighth amendment, the state's inter-
est in deterring others from committing crimes 
outweighs the state's interest in individualization. 
Thus, under Justice White's interpretation, the 
Due Process Clause allows the state to use general 
deterrence as a goal to justify enacting a particular 
death penalty scheme.79 The eighth amendment 
77 One possible exception to this statement might be 
the case of mandatory death penalty for a life prisoner. 
Justice Stewart has consistently indicated that the con-
stitutionality of such a statute is still an open question in 
his view. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280, 292-93 n.25 (1976) (plurality opinion by Justice 
Stewart); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (per 
curiam opinion invalidating statute mandating death for 
killing police officer in course of his duty). 
78 Roberts, 428 U.S. at 358. (White,J., dissenting). 
79/d; 
gives the Court the power to weigh various goals of 
the criminal justice s:ystem, but not to lose sight of 
the fact that legislatures have primary authority to 
determine the culpability of offenders under the 
Due Process Clause. Since the due process concerns 
are given primacy in Justice White's analysis, he 
interpreted McGautha as support for his theory of 
criminal responsibility. 
Integrating McGautha into both Justices' theories 
creates a dilemma. McGautha can be explained in 
terms of Justice Stewart's theory only if we accept 
his assumption that the Due Process and Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clauses point in the same 
direction-towards the goal of individualizing 
punishment. In Justice White's view, the eighth 
amendment goal of individualization of punish-
ment is subsumed under the due process goal of 
general deterrence. According to White, due proc-
ess allows legislatures to authorize death penalty 
for "deserving murders" through any system that 
has enough regularity of imposition to insure that 
the death penalty has a general deterrent effect. 
Jury discretion to withhold the death penalty is 
not itself determinative of that issue if the legisla-
ture has properly structured the jury's decision. 
The question remains, however, as to how the 
Court should determine how much and what kind 
of discretion is allowable in the furtherance of 
general deterrence. 
Justice White's opinion in Roberts, along with his 
opinions ·in other cases, provides some hints as to 
how he would answer this question. In Roberts, the 
jury's ability to ignore instructions in adjudicating 
the crime, that the plurality criticized, was not 
viewed by White as unconstitutional. This position 
rested on his interpretation of McGautha and the 
lack of any evidence of the jury's systematic refusal 
to follow instructions. Nor did the prosecutorial 
power to select persons for prosecution, the practice 
of plea bargaining or the practice of executive 
clemency, render the statutes infirm in Justice 
White's analysis.80 Citing cases dealing with plea 
bargaining81 and cases dealing with harsher sen-
tences on retrial,82 White asserted that due process 
also did not invalidate the challenged methods of 
discretion. Only those kinds of specific discretion-
ary powers that interfere with legitimate goals of 
80 !d. at 348. None of these practices violated the eighth 
amendment in his view because he had rejected the 
primacy of the goal of individualization of punishment 
in constitutional analysis. 
81 ld. at 349. 
82/d. 
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the criminal process would render a death penalty 
statute unconstitutional.s.1 
White's concurring opinion in Gregg and his 
dissent in Roberts are both replete with references 
to the adjudicative aspects of the trial.84 His elab-
orate statement of the facts in both cases indicated 
an unexpressed concern about the "fairness" of the 
adjudication. In Gregg, Justice White even dis-
cussed the jury instructions on murder when no 
question of adjudication was even considered in 
the petition for certiorari.85 Similarly in Roberts, he 
included in his opinon the jury charges as well as 
elaborate discussions of the witnesses' testimony.86 
Thus, Justice White appears to have invited dis-
cussion of these trial issues to assure himself that 
no constitutional issues of adjudication existed in 
the case.87 
Procedural Due Process 
Aside from their interpretations of McGautha, 
Justices White and Stewart generally differ in their 
beliefs as to the requirements for procedural due 
process in the sentencing context. In United States v. 
Jackson,88 for example, the Court, in an opinion by 
Justice Stewart, invalidated a portion of the federal 
kidnapping statute that allowed juries, but not 
trial judges, to impose the death penalty.88 Stewart 
reasoned that the statute burdened the exercise of 
the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial 
because if the defendant waived the jury right, he 
could avoid the possibility of a death penalty. 
Thus, in Stewart's view, the statute encouraged a 
choice against exercising one's right to a full ad-
versary adjudication.90 The result reached by Jus-
tice Stewart was to sever the death penalty provi-
sion rather than declare the entire statutory scheme 
unconstitutional as the district court had done.91 
83 See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 364 
(White,J., concurring). See text accompanying notes 181-
88 infra. 
84 428 U.S. at 212-20 (White,J., concurring); 428 U.S. 
at 339-44 (White, J., dissenting). 
85 428 U.S. at 215-16 n.4 (White,J., concurring). 
86 428 U.S. at 340-44 (White, J., dissenting). 
87 Interestingly, all five cases involved the taking of 
human life during the commission of another felony. 
Thus, lurking beneath the surface in all cases was the old 
and continuing debate surrounding the nature and pur-
poses of the "felony murder" doctrine. See, e.g., Morris, 
The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. 
PA. L. REV. 50 (1956). 
""390 u.s. 570 (1968). 
!!9 /d. at 570-72. 
90 /d. at 571-72. 
91 /d. at 591. 
What is significant about this opinion is that 
Stewart took what was a systematic constitutional 
attack on a statute and transformed it into an issue 
solely of sentencing authority. The petitioner in 
jackson had moved for a dismissal ofthe indictment 
because of the statute's unconstitutionality.92 Jus-
tice Stewart, however, eliminated the death pen-
alty from the statute and simply allowed the peti-
tioners to plead anew to the indictment without 
the risk of a death penalty.93 
Justice White wrote the only dissent in jackson, 
arguing that the statute should have been held 
constitutional.94 According to White, if the vice of 
the statute was that some people's choice of seeking 
a jury trial was burdened, the solution existed in 
adhering to constitutional standards for the taking 
of guilty pleas and waivers of jury.95 What was 
significant about Justice White's opinion was that 
he stated the constitutional issues in terms of ad-
judicative or pre-adjudicative issues. He was un-
able to adopt Justice Stewart's systematic view of 
the operation of the statutory scheme that assumed 
an interaction of legislative standards for imposing 
the death penalty with the defendant's actions at 
the pleading and adjudicative aspects of trial.96 
A second case illustrating the same divergence 
in framing of an issue appeared in Witherspoon v. 
lllinois.91 There, Justice Stewart, again writing for 
the Court, held that due process prevented the 
imposition of the death penalty by a jury which 
excluded all persons who opposed the death pen-
alty.98 The petitioners had argued that a "death 
qualified jury," resulting from a process when all 
persons professing a disbeliefin capital punishment 
were successfully challenged for cause on voir dire 
by the prosecution, was unconstitutional.99 Stewart 
S"l /d. at 571. 
93 /d. at 591. 
94 390 U.S. at 591 (White, J., dissenting) (joined by 
Justice Black). 
95 /d. at 592. 
96 Had the issue in jackson solely been that of "volun-
tariness" of the waiver of right to trial, Justices Stewart 
and White apparently would have been in complete 
agreement. In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 
(1970), Justice White wrote for the Court, holding the 
petitioner's plea of guilty to a federal kidnapping charge 
constitutional under the statute partially invalidated in 
Jackson. Justice White reasoned that the plea had been 
"voluntarily" received by the trial judge, id. at 749-51. 
Justice Stewart joined this opinion, apparently because 
the issue was solely that of the constitutional standard 
for "voluntariness." 
97 391 u.s. 510 (1968). 
98 /d. at 522-23. 
99 /d. at 516. 
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agreed with this characterization of the results of 
the voir dire selection process since no inquiry was 
made as to whether the jurors could nonetheless 
return a death penalty verdict.100 But Stewart re-
jected the petitioners argument that the "death 
qualified jury" was m9re likely to render a guilty 
verdict on the substantive offense. While rejecting 
the petitioners' due process-fair trial claim, Justice 
Stewart fashioned a new remedy. He reversed the 
death penalty as unconstitutional on the grounds 
that the jury, without the inclusion of any persons 
with religious or conscientious objections to the 
death penalty, was organized to impose death.101 
As a result of Stewart's framing and analyzing of 
the issue, the petitioners were granted a new sen-
tence of life imprisonment rather than the death 
sentence.102 
Justice White expressed disagreement with the 
Stewart approach in two ways. First, he joined 
Justice Black's dissent, which argued that the stat-
ute's process of jury selection produced an impar-
tial jury on the issue of death.103 Justice Black also 
attacked Stewart's implication of constitutional un-
fairness in the process by pointing out that the 
petitioners' own able counsel failed to attack the 
jury in the manner invalidated by Justice Stew-
art.104 . 
Second, White wrote his own dissenting opin-
ion,'05 which was in the form of a short essay 
defending the legislature's delegation of t.he death 
penalty decision to a certain kind ofjury.106 Justice 
White reasoned that the legislative vote to author-
ize a death penalty had included those opposed to 
the death penalty for whatever ground. Having 
decided to retain the death penalty by majority 
vote, the exclusion of the minority from the jury 
was a means of maintaining the traditional policy 
that jury verdicts be unanimou~.107 He considered 
the exclusion of those who could "hang a jury" as 
justifiable because one such citizen on a jury could 
prevent a decision to impose death and as a result 
the penalty would never be imposed. Although 
White generally agreed with Justice Black's anal-
ysis of the fairness of the particular jury in Wither-
spoon, he sought to preserve the possibility that 
100 /d. at 520-21. 
101 /d. 
102 /d. at 523-24 n.21. 
103 391 U.S. at 532 (Black, J., dissenting, joined by 
Justice White). 
104 /d. at 533-34. 
105 391 U.S. at 540 (White, J., dissenting). 
106 ld. at 541-42. 
107 ld. 
some juries may be unconstitutionally composed.108 
He indicated that some legislative delegations of 
the death penalty decisonmaking powers were 
probably unconstitutional, but other delegations-
such as to a non-unanimous jury-were probably 
constitutional.109 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Prior to Furman, the Court, with Justices Stewart 
and White participating, decided two cases involv-
ing the application of the eighth amendment's 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to state 
cases. In Robinson v. California, 110 Justice Stewart 
wrote for a plurality of the Court and held the 
imposition ofajail term on an individual found to 
be a "narcotics addict" unconstitutional under the 
eighth and fourteenth amendments.m Justice 
White wrote one of the dissenting opinions, disa-
greeing with Stewart's interpretation of the Court's 
role under the eighth amendment.112 In Powell v. 
Texas, 113 a plurality of the Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of a Texas penal statute114 prohibit-
ing public drunkenness as it applied to a "chronic 
alcoholic." This time, Justice White wrote a con-
curring opinion115 joining the plurality, relying on 
his interpretation of Robinson to indicate the circum-
stances when the Court could invalidate a convic-
tion for public drunkenness. Justice Stewart joined 
in the dissenting opinion in Powell, which i_nter-
preted Robinson as prohibiting any "punishment" 
of "sick" individuals, be they "narcotic addicts" or 
"chronic alcoholics" under the eighth amend-
ment.116 · 
Justice Stewart viewed Robinson from a perspec-
tive that assumes a conflict between a "medical" 
and "punitive'' model of social control over nar-
cotic addiction. m There, a Los Angeles police of-
ficer had arrested the defendant Ropinson after 
stopping a car in which he was a passenger for a 
traffic violation.118 During the course of his inves-
tigation, the officer testified that he observed "scar 
108 /d. at 541 n.l. 
109 /d. at 542 n.2. 
110 370 u.s. 660 (1962). 
111 /d. at 667. 
112 Id. at 685 (White,J., dissenting). 
113 392 u.s. 514 (1968). 
114 TEX. PENAL CooE ANN. art. 477 (Vernon 1952) 
(repealed 1973). 
115 392 U.S. at 548 (White,J., concurring). 
116 ld. at 554 (Fortas, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart 
and Brennan,JJ.). 
117 Su, e.g., Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal Responsi-
bility, 84 YALE L.J. 413 (1975). 
118 370 U.S. at 661. 
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tissue and discoloration" on Robinson's arms. The 
arresting officer also testified that Robinson ad-
mitted using narcotics. Following Robinson's ar-
rest, 119 an officer from the narcotics bureau exam-
ined Robinson's arms. At trial this narcotics officer 
testified that, based on his ten years of experience 
in the field, in his opinion the marks were caused 
by the use of non-sterile hypodermic needles. Al-
though the narcotics officer stated that Robinson 
was neither under the influence of drugs nor suf-
fering from withdrawal symptoms at the time of 
the examination, he admitted having used narcot-
ics recently. However, Robinson testified denying 
ever using narcotics and explained the condition 
of his arms as resulting from an allergic condition. 
Two witnesses corroborated his testimony.120 
On the basis of these facts, Justice Stewart as-
sumed that the jury had been asked to find Robin-
son addicted to heroin in a physiological sense. 
This assumption was made despite the fact that 
the state made no effort to prove physiological 
addiction through the presentation of the results of 
medical testing, nor did it offer any evidence of 
Robinson's physiological dependence on narcot-
ics.121 Despite this lack of evidence, Justice Stew-
art's opinion assumed and asserted that "narcotics 
addiction is an illness."122 The assumption was 
necessary for his reasoning by analogy that any 
time in jail for the "patient," Larry Robinson, 
would have been similar to jailing a person for a 
"common cold."123 
One of the operative effects of Justice Stewart's 
perspective of a conflict between methods of social 
control is that he arguably misanalyzed the pur-
pose of the California legislative scheme that he 
declared unconstitutional. Without any discussion, 
Justice Stewart blissfully characterized the statute 
under consideration, a provision of the California 
Health and Safety Code, as imposing a "criminal 
119 Robinson was arrested for violating the California 
Health and Safety Code, which provided in part that: 
"No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be 
addicted to the use of narcotics .... " CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY ConE § 1172 (repealed in 1972). For violating 
this statute, Robinson was subject to 90 days in jail and 
two Jears of subsequent parole. 
1 370 U.S. at 662. 121 The major issue in the trial below concerned the 
constitutionality of the "search" by the arresting officer. 
The Court declined to consider this issue. /d. at 661 n.2. 
The testimony in the trial below in Robinson is reprinted 
in J. GoLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWTIZ & R. ScHWARTZ, CRIM-
INAL LAw: THEORY AND PRACTICE 229-42 (1974). 
122 370 U.S. at 667. 
123 /d. 
offense"124 and assumed that its purposes were 
totally punitive. Of course, the use of jails as a 
sanction and the police as invoking agents, under 
the statute, might have supported this characteri-
zation and his assumption of the statute's pur-
pose.125 But if we analyze the statute in the context 
of the total legislative scheme for dealing with 
"narcotic addiction," Justice Stewart's assumption 
about the purposes of the statute are at least seri-
ously questioned. 
At the time of Robinson, California had another 
statute permitting the involuntary committment of 
narcotics addicts. 126 That statute, a provision of the 
California Welfa.-e and Institution Code, defined 
a narcotics addict as "any person who habitually 
takes or otherwise uses to the extent of having lost the 
power of self-control certain narcotic drugs."127 The 
statute involved in Robinson, on the other hand, had 
no statutory definition of addiction but the trial 
judge had defined the term for the jury as follows: 
"The word 'addicted' means, strongly disposed to 
some taste or practice or habituated, especially to 
drugs. In order to inquire as to whether a person is 
addicted to the use of narcotics is in effect an inquiry as to 
his habit in that regard. " 128 
The distinction between these two definitions of 
addiction is between what might be called a "vol-
untary addict" and an "involuntary addict." The 
voluntary or habitual addict defined in Robinson in 
some sense chooses to use narcotics, whereas the 
involuntary addict of the Health Welfare and In-
stitution Code uses the drugs because he.has lost 
control of his ability to choose in this particular 
regard.129 
Using the distinction between the two statutory 
definitions of addiction, it was possible for a judge 
to analyze the social control functions of the two 
statutes as congruent rather than conflicting. For 
example, as Justice Clark pointed out in his dis-
senting opinion in Robinson, the legislature sought 
to cure only the involuntary addict through invol-
untary confinement.130 Under the involuntary 
commitment statute, a confined person was dis-
charged after a minimum of three months if treat-
124 /d. 
125 See note 121 supra. 
126 See CAL. WELF. & INST. ConE § 5350 (repealed 
1965). 
127 Jd. (emphasis added). 
128 370 U.S. a·t 680 (Clark, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
129 /d. at 681. 
130 /d. at 681-83. 
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ment was not deemed possible and the person was 
considered "not dangerous."1:s1 The significant fea-
ture of this statute's means of effectuating ."treat-
ment" through coercive means was a recognition 
that treatment may not be possible. Such a view of 
achieving treatment also was a recognition that 
treatment is sought for social ends or as a means of 
social control. 
If the involuntary confinement process for treat-
ment and social protection was thus viewed as a 
social control mechanism, a judge perhaps could 
also have analyzed the social control purposes of 
the "voluntary addiction" statute involved in Ro-
binson. Justice Clark engaged in such an analysis 
and suggested that the underlying social control 
purpose of the statute was to encourage persons to 
exercise self-control in choosing not to use drugs.132 
He justified the use of a minimum jail term as a 
sanction upon a person like the defendant Robin-
son on the view that the negative sanction could 
modify his choice to use drugs. The two-year parole 
period that followed the jail term also involved 
tests to determine if he had changed his habits 
regarding heroin use.133 This view of the purpose 
of the statute explained the lack of reliance on 
expert medical testimony by the state in Robinson, 
as well as the state's use of negative sanctions plus 
surveillance. 
Whether or not one agrees with his answer, 
Justice Clark, at least, perceived the questions of 
legislative purpose in Robinson. On the other hand, 
Justice Stewart failed even to acknowledge this 
question because of the clear dichotomy in his 
analysis between "medical" and "punitive" meth-
ods of social control. Stewart even intimated in a 
footnote that the civil procedures should have been 
utilized in Robinson's case134 without any discus-
sion of the constitutionality of those procedures.1:ss 
Furthermore, any use of criminal disposition ap-
1 ~ 1 CAL WELF. & lNST. CODE§ 5355.1 (repealed 1965). 
132 370 U.S. at 680-81 (Clark,J., dissenting). See also J. 
WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 126-33 (1975). 
133 Robinson's actual sentence included a ninety day· 
jail term and a two year period of parole. One of the 
conditions of his parole was that he submit to a Nalline 
test. See J. GoLDSTEIN, A. DERSHowrrz, & R. ScHWARTZ 
supra note 121, at 242. 
134 370 U.S. at 665 n. 7. 
135 The Court has never directly decided on the con-
stitutionality of narcotic civil commitment proceedings. 
State courts have considered constitutional challenges to 
schemes and generally upheld them. See, e.g., In the 
Matter of Narcotics Addiction Control Commission v. 
James, 22 N.Y.2d 545, 551, 293 N.Y.S.2d 531, 535-36, 
240 N.E.2d 29, 32 (1968). 
parently leads him to characterize the process as 
"punishment" and thus in conflict with his pre-
ferred goal of rehabilitation. 136 
The tentative term "apparent" is used here to 
explain Justice Stewart's result in Robinson, because 
his precise holding has never been clarified. 
Through his use of the term "punishment," there 
exist numerous questions concerning when the 
Constitution permits the use of the criminal proc-
ess. Although Justice Stewart found constitutional 
fault with the addiction portion of the statute, he 
explicitly asserted without explanation that the 
state can use the criminal process to prohibit "the 
unauthorized manufacture, prescription, sale, pur-
chase, or possession ofnarcotics."137 Moreover, one 
wonders what Stewart meant by "punishment" 
when, by the way of dictum in Robinson, he gave a 
constitutional blessing to the involuntary commit-
ment of narcotics addicts. Simple deprivation of an 
individual's liberty by the state was apparently not 
the equivalent of punishment in Justice Stewart's 
view. Finally, the precise nature of the constitu-
tional defect in the statute in Robinson was unclear. 
Was the infirmity in the use of criminal process in 
"convicting" a person of "addiction" or in the use 
of jail as a place of confinement? State courts 
interpreted the statute's constitutional defect as the 
use of penal facilities for addicts.138 On the other 
hand, other Supreme Court justices have inter-
preted the defect in the California statutory scheme 
to be in the labelling of the addicted person a 
"criminal" by the legal process.139 To answer the 
question one way as opposed to the other has 
significant impact on whether one thinks the pri-
mary impact of the eighth amendment will be on 
the "adjudicative" or "dispositive" aspects of crim-
inal process. 140 
136 370 U.S. at 667 n.8. 
137 /d. at 664-65. 
138 See, e.g., In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 378 P.2d 
793, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963). 
139 See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. at 678 
(Harlan, J., concurring). 
140 The adjudicative parts of the criminal process in-
clude all issues decided at trial and in appellate review of 
the trial process. The dispositive aspects of the criminal 
process include any decision where the legal system au-
thorizes an official to exercise direct control over individ-
uals. Under this definition, trial judge sentencing is essen-
tially part of a larger category of legal decisions that 
include decisions by prison and parole officials and even 
decisions by officials in a civil commitment process. For 
a discussion of the implications of the distinction between 
dispositive and adjudicative decision making, see Palmer, 
A Model of Criminal Dispositions: An Alternative to Official 
Discretion in Sentencing, 62 GEO. L. J. I (1973); Palmer, The 
206 LARRY I. PALMER [Vol. 70 
Despite assertions by Justice Stewart to the con-
trary,Justice White's dissent in Robinson interpreted 
Stewart's opinion as raising serious doubts about 
the state's ability to prohibit the use of narcotics as 
opposed to the purchase, possession or sale. White 
believed that voluntary use was a necessary precon-
dition to addiction, except in the rare instance of 
legitimate medical addiction.141 Thus, if addiction 
failed the constitutional test, a criminal statute 
punishing use must also fail the constitutional test. 
Neither statute would be unconstitutional under 
White's analysis, however, because he interpreted 
the issue in Robinson in terms of "responsibility." 
For Justice White, the essential question in Robinson 
was whether the state convicted a person of addic" 
tion who had not lost his power of self-control. 142 
By framing the issue in this manner, Justice 
White adopted Justice Clark's interpretation of the 
statute and then looked for actual evidence of lack 
of self-control. Finding no such evidence in the 
record, he consequently concluded that the Court 
should have affirmed the conviction.143 According 
to White, the ultimate issue of responsibility was a 
Court, and not a legislative, problem. His view of 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in Ro-
binson was thus very similar to the common law 
requirement of "voluntariness" before criminal 
conviction.144 
White's constitutional theory of responsibility 
under the eighth amendment was made even 
clearer by his statement in Powell v. Texas. 145 There, 
the Court, in a plurality opinion written by Justice 
Marshall, upheld the imposition of a criminal 
fine146 on a "chronic alcoholic" under the Texas 
Penal Code prohibiting public drunkenness. 147 The 
defendant in Powell had been arrested and jailed 
pending trial the next morning for being intoxi-
Appellate Court Role in Mandatory Sentencing, 26 U.C.L.A. L. 
Rev. 301 (1979). 
Using this distinction, Justice White's theory of the 
eighth amendment could be characterized as primarily 
concerned with adjudicative issues in relation to the 
disposition of death. See text accompanying notes 48-6 I 
supra. Justice Stewart's theory of the eighth amendment 
could be characterized as primarily concerned with the 
dispositive issues of the death penalty. See text accompa-
nying notes 29-47 supra. 
141 370 U.S. at 688-89 (White, J., dissenting). 
142 /d. at 688. 
143 /d. at 687-88. 
144/d. 
145 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
146 Petitioner had been fined S50 upon conviction. /d. 
at 5 I 7 (plurality opinion by Justice Marshall). 147 TEx. PENAL ConE ANN. art. 477 (Vernon 1952) 
(repealed 1973). 
cated in a public place. At the trial, the defense 
presented an expert witness whose testimony was 
the basis of the trial judge's finding of the fact that: 
"'(1) That chronic alcoholism is a disease ... ;' (2) 
That a chronic alcoholic does not appear in public 
by his own volition but under a compulsion symp-
tomatic of the disease ... ; '(3) That Leroy Powell, 
defendant herein, .. .is affiicted with the disease of 
chronic alcoholism."'148 The defendant also testi-
fied as to the history of his drinking problems and 
his numerous arrests for drunkenness.149 
'fhe state offered no contradictory expert testi-
mony. On cross-examination of the defendant's 
expert witness, the state elicited an opinion that 
when the defendant was sober, he knew "the dif-
ference between right and wrong" and that the 
first drink was a voluntary exercise of his will.150 
The state's cross-examination of the defendant elic-
ited an admission that he had one drink on the 
morning of trial, and had discontinued after one 
drink. The state's argument was simply that no 
defense had been presented since the defendant 
was "legally sane" under the state's test for insan-
ity.I51 Despite its findings of fact, the trial judge 
accepted the state's view and ruled as a matter of 
law that there was no defense. The trial judge 
found the defendant guilty and imposed a S50 
fine.'52 
Justice Marshall, for the plurality of the Court, 
affirmed the conviction. In doing so, Marshall 
interpreted Robinson only as prohibiting the use of 
criminal sanctions where no act had been 
proven.153 Since, in Powell, the state elicited evi-
dence of voluntary drinking during its cross-ex-
amination, this was held sufficient to meet the act 
requirement for criminal liability. Thus, Justice 
Marshall took Robinson as standing for the propo-
sition that the eighth amendment requires a dis-
tinction between an "Act" and a "Status" in crim-
inal adjudication. 154 For the former, the criminal 
process can be used, but the Constitution prohibits 
a conviction solely on the basis of the latter. 
Adopting a similar view that Robinson had dealt 
with limitations on the adjudication of criminal 
liability, Justice White's concurring opinion in 
Powell pointed out specillcally the constitutional 
148 392 U.S. at 521. 
149 /d. at 519. 150 /d. at 519-20. 
151 /d. at 520. 
152 /d. at 517. 
153 /d. at 532. 154 /d. at 532-34. 
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perimeters of voluntariness, 155 perhaps on the belief 
that Justice Marshall had failed to do so.156 Under 
Justice White's theory of constitutional "voluntar-
iness," if the record demonstrated the existence of 
chronic disease and compulsion to drink, as well as 
the inability to avoid public places, a conviction under 
the Texas statute would be unconstitutional.157 He 
recognized that a conviction for being drunk in a 
public place would depend more often on economic 
status than on the nature of the disease, but this 
use of the Court's power to invalidate a conviction 
of an "unfortunate" in a hypothetical case did not 
trouble him.158 He voted for affirmance because 
the-record in Powell failed to include evidence that 
the defendant could not have gotten drunk at 
home-conduct not prohibited by the statute.159 
In ~ving Robinson precedential effect through his 
concurring opinion in Powell, Justice White made 
clear what was only implicit in his dissent in Robin-
son. As he stated in the opening paragraph of his 
opinion: 
If it cannot be a crime to have an irresistable com-
pulsion to use narcotics, Robinson v. California, I do 
not see how it can constitutionally be a crime to 
yield to such a compulsion. Punishing an addict for 
using drugs, convicts for addiction under a different 
name. Distinguishing between the two crimes is like 
forbidding criminal conviction for being sick with 
flu or epilepsy but permitting punishment for run-
ning a fever or having a convulsion. Unless Robinson 
is to be abandoned, the use of narcotics by an addict 
must be beyond the reach of the criminal law. 
Similarly, the chronic alcoholic with an irresistable 
urge to consume alcohol should not be punishable 
for drinking or for being drunk.160 
Even though Justice White went on to distinguish 
Powell's conviction from a conviction of a chronic 
alcoholic with a compulsion to drink, he indicated 
that when he does give operative effect to the 
eighth amendment, it will be in terms of imposing 
restraints on state's processes of criminal adjudi-
cation rather than on its criminal dispositional 
process.161 
155 392 U.S. at 550-52 (White, J., concurring); see also 
3 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 361 (1971). 
156 392 U.S. at 535 (plurality opinion by Justice Mar-
shall). 
157 392 U.S. at 551-52 (White,]., concurring). 
158 /d. at 551. 
159 /d. at 552-54. 
ISO /d. at 548-49. 
161/d. 
Not surprisingly, Justice Stewart, whose focus 
under the eighth amendment is on the formal 
sanctioning process, joined Justice Fortas' dissent 
in Powell. 162 For Fortas, as for Justice Stewart, 
Robinson stood for principles of punishment. As 
Fortas argued, "[c]riminal penalties may not be 
inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he 
is powerless to change."163 By this statement of 
Robinson's principle, Justice Fortas, with Justice 
Stewart's full concurrence, centered upon the ac-
tual infliction of the sanction on a person deemed 
unable to change the condition for which he is 
being "punished." 
Unlike Justices Marshall and White, Justices 
Fortas and Stewart accepted the trial court's "find-
ing of facts" that alcoholism is a disease and the 
individual defendant was suffering from this dis-
ease.164 However, the Fortas-Stewart analysis must 
get past these questions of the nature of criminal 
liability in order to engage in meaningful consti-
tutional discussion of imposing criminal sanctions. 
The White-Marshall theory, on the other hand, 
avoided acceptance of the trial court's findings. 
According to them, discussion of formal sanction-
ing or the dispositive processes presupposes a clar-
ification of the constitutional limits on defining 
criminal liability. 
As a result of their participation in Powell and 
Robinson, both Justices Stewart and White had an 
opportunity to give different interpretations of the 
impact of the ever-elusive term "punishment" prior 
to the specific litigation over the death penalty. 
Justice White defined the issues in Powell and 
Robinson in terms of the limitations on adjudicative 
processes because of his standards of constitutional 
responsibility. In those same cases, Justice Stewart 
defined the issues in terms of the constitutional 
limits on the state's imposition of a particular 
sanction. This difference in defining issues indicates 
a fundamental differing concept of the Court's role 
under the eighth amendment. 
II. DEATH PENALTY CASES SINCE 1976 
Since 1976, the Court has decided three major 
cases involving the death penalty. In Coker v. Geor-
gia, 165 the Court invalidated a statute authorizing 
the death penalty for the crime of rape. During the 
same term, the Court found the procedures used to 
impose the death penalty on a particular individ-
162 392 U.S. at 554 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
163 /d. at 567 (emphasis added). 
164 /d. at 557 n.l. 
165 433 u.s. 584 (1977). 
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ual unconstitutional in Gardner v. Florida. 166 Last 
term, in Lockett v. Ohio,lffl the Court invalidated a 
death penalty statute because its definition of 
"mitigating circumstances" was incompatible with 
the standards for individualization set forth in 
Gregg, Proffitt andjurek. 
In all three of these new cases, Justices Stewart 
and White agreed with the Court's judgments 
declaring the death penalty unconstitutional, but 
continued to demonstrate through their voting be-
havior and opinions fundamental difference in 
their analytical approaches. In Lockett and Gardner, 
Justice White wrote concurring opinions disagree-
ing with the reasoning of the plurality opinion that 
Justice Stewart had joined. In Coker, however, Jus-
tice Stewart joined the plurality opinion of Justice 
White. This basic agreement in Coker simply indi-
cates that there is common ground between the 
two constitutional analyses. 
Coker and the Balancing of Eighth Amendment Interests 
In Coker, Justice White's plurality opinion held 
that a statute authorizing the death penaity for the 
crime of rape violated the eighth amendment, 
because in such an instance death would be a 
"grossly disproportionate" penalty in relationship 
to the crime.168 This conclusion was reached by 
both Justice White and Justice Stewart despite the 
fact that the death penalty had been imposed in 
accordance with the same statutory procedures 
they both had approved the previous term in Gregg. 
In the factual circumstances of the case, the jury 
found. that two of the three statutory aggravating 
circumstances justified imposing the death penalty 
on the defendant, Coker. First, he had previously 
been convicted of a "capital felony."169 Coker had 
been convicted of murder, rape, kidnapping and 
aggravated assault. While serving sentences for 
these crimes, he escaped and committed the crimes 
involved in the instant case. Second, the jury found 
that Coker had committed the rape while engaged 
in another "capital felony or aggravated felony. " 170 
The record indicated that when he entered the 
victim's house brandishing a board, he tied up her 
husband and took his .money and the keys to the 
family car, prior to raping the victim. 171 Thus, the 
jury found he had committed armed robbery, an 
aggravated felony, while committing rape. The 
166 430 u.s. 349 (1977). 
167 98 S. Ct. 2954(1978). 
168 433 U.S. at 592. 
169 /d. at 587-91. 
170 /d. at 589. 
171 /d. at 587. 
third aggravating circumstance, that the rape was 
committed "outrageously or wantonly" was not 
alleged to be present because the record indicated 
that the victim of Coker's rape was "unharmed." 
For Justice White, "unharmed," in this context, 
meant only that she was not further physically 
brutalized by Coker after the rape. 172 
If the primary focus of Justice White's analysis 
were whether the defendant deserved the death 
penalty, the state's decision to put Coker to death 
was hardly unreasonable. Justice White's theory of 
the Court's authority under the eighth amend-
ment, however, required more than a judgment 
that the particular defendant deserves a severe 
penalty, for he admitted in his opinion that Coker 
deserved a severe sanction.173 Under his constitu-
tional analysis, since the legislature had authorized 
the death penalty as opposed to another penalty, 
it was the Court's function to balance the legislative 
judgment against constitutional standards in de-
termining whether "the punishment fits the 
crime." Thus, history, the fact that other legisla-
tures had rejected the death penalty for rape, 174 
and the fact that Georgia juries and trial judges 
seldom imposed the death penalty for rape were 
considered significant in Justice White's conclu-
sion175 that the death penalty was "disproportion-
ate" punishment for the crime of rape. 
Justice White's proportionality analysis was es-
sentially a comparison of competing interests 
served by. the criminal law. He acknowledged that 
by sanctioning rape as a crime, the community 
protects its interest in "personal integrity" and 
"autonomy" as well as its interest in sexual integ-
rity.176 By invalidating the death penalty for rape, 
White asserted that those interests· do not justify 
taking the -life of the rapist because of the com-
munity's general interest in protecting life. Only 
the community's interest in life as exemplified in 
the crime of murder, in his view, justified taking 
the life of the offender. While the death penalty 
for murder serves legitimate goals for the criminal 
justice system, Justice White viewed the death 
penalty as an "excessive" furtherance of those goals 
if imposed for rape. 177 
Justice Stewart fully concurred in White's anal-
ysis in Coker, because Stewart's constitutional anal-
ysis of punishment involved in effect the same type 
172 /d. 
173 /d. at 598. 
174 /d. at 593-96. 
175 /d. at 596-97. 
176 /d. at 597. 
177 /d. at 598. 
1979] TWO PERSPECTIVES 209 
of analysis of competing goals with a slightly dif-
ferent emphasis. At the heart of Justice Stewart's 
analysis was an unarticulated equation about the 
relationship of the goals of the criminal process. 
The underlying purposes of his Gregg standards for 
individualization were to preserve the hope of "re-
habilitation" that he had mentioned in Furman. 178 
Justice Stewart's emphasis on rehabilitation did 
not necessarily mean that he thought a recidivist 
like Coker could be rehabilitated. Rather, his use 
of rehabilitation referred to the goals of the system 
and not to the specific treatability of an individ-
ual.179 For Stewart, rehabilitation is a code name 
for preserving the value of"human dignity" within 
the process of state control.180 By preserving the life 
of a rapist, Justice Stewart indicated that the social 
control goals of the criminal law are limited by 
constitutional norms or values. Although Stewart 
sought to further those norms by first asking ques-
tions about the procedures for sanctions, he would 
enforce those norms when they are challenged 
directly by state legislatures and courts. Thus the 
issue in Coker, where the state had adopted proce-
dures he had already approved in Gregg, was 
whether the state can justify taking the life of the 
offender for the crime of rape. In answering the 
question posed, Justice Stewart's theory required 
the same kind of balancing process as Justice 
White's analysis. 
Gardner and Constitutional Procedures For Imposing 
Death 
In Gardner, Justice Stewart joined Justice Stevens' 
plurality opinion invalidating the particular pro-
cedures used to impose the death penalty on the 
defendant.181 Under the separate sentencing pro-
ceedings for the death penalty required by Florida 
law and upheld in Proffitt, the jury had advised the 
118 See 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
179/d. 
180 For example in concluding his Woodson opinion, 
Justice Stewart had stated: 
While the prevailing practice of individualizing sen-
tencing determinations generally reflects simply en-
lightened policy rather than a constitutional imper-
ative, we believe that in capital cases the fundamen-
tal respect for humanity. underlying the Eighth 
Amendment, ..• requires consideration of the char-
acter and record of the individual offender and the 
circumstances of the particular offense as a: consti-
tutionally indispensable part of the process of inflict-
ing the penalty of death. 
428 U.S. at 304. (plurality opinion by Justice Stewart) 
(citations omitted). 
181 430 u.s. 349 (1977). 
judge to impose life imprisonment in Gardner's 
case because of the mitigating circumstances. The 
trial judge had ordered a pre-sentence report 
shortly after the jury retired to deliberate on the 
· penalty. Several weeks after the jury's advisory 
recommendation of life imprisonment, the judge 
received the pre-sentence report. He then entered 
findings of fact and concluded that the murder 
had been committed under one of the statutory 
"aggravating circumstances" to wit, in "an espe-
cially heinous and cruel manner."182 The trial 
judge relied in part on the confidential portions of 
the pre-sentence report that had not been disclosed 
to defense counsel. On appeal, the Florida court 
affirmed the death sentence after "carefully review-
ing the record." The record on appeal, however, 
did not contain the confidential portion of the pre-
sentence report. 183 
Justice Stevens reasoned that the imposition of 
the death penalty on Gardner violated due process 
because the constitutionality of the death penalty 
was dependent upon its fair administration.184 In 
his view, due process required the trial judge to 
disclose fully the contents of the report to ensure 
its accuracy in an adversary context.185 By impli-
cation, due process also required· the appellate 
court to consider the pre-sentence report in its 
assessment of the "entire ·record." This analysis fit 
well with Justice Stewart's constitutional theory of 
punishment. 
Justice White had one major disagreement with 
Justice Stevens' analysis. White believed that the 
procedures used to sentence Gardner to death vio-
lated the eighth amendment rather than the four-
teenth amendment.186 Justice White reasoned that 
the use of secret information about the individual's 
character in imposing the death penalty would 
decrease the reliability of the death penalty deci-
sion-making required by Woodson. Using the Due 
Process Clause as a basis for the Court's decision 
implied for Justice White the possibility of apply-
ing the Court's standards for sentencing in death 
penalty cases to other sentencing issues.187 As in-
dicated by the analysis of his pre-Furman due proc-
ess cases, Justice White was generally reluctant to 
concede that the Due Process Clause authorizes the 
182 /d. at 353 (plurality opinion by Justice Stevens). 
183 /d. at 354. 
184 /d. at 361. 
185 /d. at 359-60. 
186 430 U.S. at 364 (White, J., concurring). 
181/d. 
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Court to impose procedures on sentencing deci-
• 188 
S10nS. 
Lockett and the Crime Unfit for Punishment 
Just last term, in Lockett, Justice Stewart joined 
the plurality opinion of Chief Justice Burger inter-
preting Gregg to invalidate the Ohio statute because 
the mitigating circumstances were too narrowly 
defined. 189 The Ohio statute authorizing the death 
penalty for "aggravated murder"190 failed this test 
because the trial judge was asked to consider only 
three circumstances as mitigating factors in deter-
mining whether to impose death.191 Justice Stewart 
concurred in tl_J.e Chief Justice's analysis that the 
statutory standards of whether the victim induced 
or facilitated the offense, whether the offense was 
committed under duress, or whether the offense 
was primarily the result of a psychosis, were too 
narrow to permit proper "individualization" of the 
decision to impose death. 
Justice White, in his concurring and· dissenting 
opinion, 192 reasoned however that the statute was 
unconstitutional on a ground ignored by the Chief 
Justice, and by implication Justice Stewart. Justice 
White interpreted the statute as authorizing the 
death penalty without a finding that the defendant 
had a "purpose" to cause the victim's death. 193 
Petitioner Lockett was convicted of "aggravated 
murder" on the basis of her participation in a 
robbery-murder with three ·other persons. One of 
her co-felons actually shot and killed the robbery 
188 If Justice White conceded that due process applied 
to the Gardna case, he would have been forced to address 
the continued viability of Williams v. New York, 337 
U.S. 241 (1949), which had upheld the constitutionality 
of non-disclosure of pre-sentence reports in a death pen-
alty case under the fourteenth amendment Pue Process 
Clause. Justice Stevens distinguished Williams in his plu-
rality opinion in Gardna, but his distinction relied on the 
assumption that particular procedures are prerequisite to 
the constitutionality of a death penalty statute under the 
eighth and fourteenth amendments. 430 U.S. at 357-58 
(plurality opinion by Justice Stevens). Justice White 
rejected that basic assumption in his concurring opinion 
in Gregg and his dissenting opinion in Robats. 
By insisting on a different doctrinal basis for his deci-
sion, Justice White's position indicated that the contin-
uing debates about "selective" incorporation of the Bill 
of Rights is still a part of the CQurt's debates about the 
cri!llinal process. 
189 98 S. Ct. at 2965-67. 
190 The Ohio statute is reprinted in the appendix of the 
Court's opinion. ld. at 2967. 
l91ld. 
192 ld. at 2982 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). 
193 ld. at 2983. 
victim. The homicide was alleged to be aggravated 
because it had been committed for the purpose of 
escaping detection for "aggravated robbery" and 
during the course of aggravated robbery.194 
White pointed out that in Lockett's separate 
trial, the judge had instructed the jury that if she 
engaged in a "common design with others to rob 
by force" she was presumed to have acquiesced in 
the means chosen by her co-conspirators. 195 In ad-
dition, her liability for the resulting death was 
determined by the following standard: 
If the conspired robbery and the manner of its 
accomplishment would be reasonably likely to pro-
duce death, each plotter is equally guilty with the 
principal offender as an aider or abettor in the 
homicide .... An intent to kill by an aider and abettor m/9' 
be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt under .nuh 
circwnstaru:es. 196 
This definition ofintent alone made the imposition 
of death unconstitutional in Justice White's view. 
He argued that without a finding of fact that 
Lockett had a purpose to bring about death, the 
state's imposition of the death penalty was uncon-
stitutional. At best, in his opinion, Lockett was 
convicted on the basis of "recklessness."197 
White went on to assert in his Lockett concurrence 
that the society had made a judgment that the 
"culpability" of those who act with the "purpose 
to take life" is distinguishable from the individual 
who acts without such purpose. Thus, if the death 
penalty is imposed, the distinction can be ig-
nored. 198 The clear implication in his theory in 
Lockett is that imposing the death penalty as a 
sanction put limitations on the adjudicative aspects 
of the criminal law. Furthermore, Justice White's 
Lockett analysis raised questions about the appli-
cability of the death penalty to the "felony murder 
doctrine," since Ohio's aggravated murder statute 
is similar to the common law felony murder rule. 
But this concern with the adjudicative aspect of 
the process by which death is inflicted was previ-
ously noticeable in his opinions in Gregg and Rob-
erts.199 
The post-1976 death penalty cases thus demon-
strate two things about the two Justices' judicial 
philosophy. First, viewing the death penalty from 
194 !d. at 295 7. 
195 ld. at 2984 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). 
196 ld. (emphasis added). 
197 /d. at -, 98 S. Ct. at 2984-85. 
198ld. 
199 See text accompanying notes 48-61, supra. 
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either Justice Stewart's punishment perspective or 
Justice White's responsibility perspective leads to 
the same type of analysis when the question is the 
"disproportionality" of the death penalty to a par-
ticular crime. The proportionality analysis neces-
sarily requires an analvsis that connects the legis-
lative judgment about what is crime and what 
sanction should be authorized for a proven 
crime.200 Both Justice Stewart's and Justice White's 
analysis permits the Court to embark upon this 
judicial "second guessing" of legislative policy 
judgment about the death penalty. 
Second, Justice White's eighth amendment anal-
ysis of the death penalty may have implications for 
problems not presently viewed as problems in sen-
tencing. As he stated in his concurrence in Lockett, 
the constitution has minimal standards for criminal 
liability that must be met before the death penalty 
can be imposed. There is a constitutional doctrine 
of mens rea that must be met before the state is 
justified in using the death penalty under the 
Constitution. 
III. SoME FUTURE IssuES SuRROUNDING THE DEATH 
PENALTY 
In analyzing the Stewart and White approaches 
to the death penalty, it is interesting to hypothesize 
how the two Justices would respond to the appli-
cation of the penalty to various other offenses and 
issues. For instance, were the issue of the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty for armed robbery 
before the Court, we should expect a basic agree-
ment between Justices Stewart and White as to the 
method of reasoning and the resuit because of their 
agreement about proportionality in Coker. But such 
a rather simple application of Coker is unlikely since 
even state appellate courts have declared the death 
penalty for armed robbery unconstitutional in 
those few states where the legislature authorizes the 
death penalty for armed robbery.201 
On the other hand, there do exist other issues 
that may come before the Court that would likely 
rekindle the basic Stewart-White disagreement. 
For example, the constitutionality of a statute au-
thorizing a mandatory death penalty for a prisoner 
serving a life term who kills a prison guard while 
trying to escape,202 should drive their alliance on 
200 Su text accompanying notes 168-80 supra. 
201 The Georgia Supreme Court vacated the death 
penalty for armed robbery in Gregg even though the 
Georgia statute permitted the death penalty for armed 
robbery. GA. CoDE ANN. § 26-1902 (1972 Supp.). Su 
G~g v. State, 233 Ga. 117, 210 S.E.2d 659 (1974). 
Su R. I. GEN. LAw§ 11-23-2 (1977 Supp.)" 
"proportionality" apart. The Court has yet to de-
cide upon the constitutionality of such a statute.203 
But, since there is enough political pressure favor-
ing the death penalty204 and unrest in prison,205 at 
some point the question is likely to come before the 
Court. At that point, Justices White and Stewart 
should define the issue in their own individual 
terms-either punishment or responsibility-even 
if they agree on the result in the case. 
Another basis of disagreement may arise in the 
context of defendant requests for the death penalty 
to be imposed. At the time of this writing only 
Gary Gilmore has been executed since the Court's 
decision in Gregg in 1976. Gilmore's execution was 
in many senses at "his request" and over the objec-
tion of institutional litigants.206 The attempts "to 
save" Gilmore's life represents a more general prob-
lem that the Court may have to address: Under 
what· circumstances can an offender "waive" ave-
nues available to avoid the death penalty and 
"consent" to his execution? Justice White, in his 
dissent to the vacating of a stay in Gilmore v. "Uiah201 
declared that a defendant cannot consent to an 
unconstitutional imposition of the death penalty 
under the eighth amendment.208 Of course, this 
view is -consonant with his general theory that the 
state or the criminal process, but not the offender, 
must determine whether the offender deserves the 
death penalty. , 
Interestingly, Justice Stewart joined the majority 
in vacating the stay in Gilmore. The per curiam 
judgment considered evidence of Gilmore's indi-
vidual capacity to waive his right to appeal. A 
finding that Gilmore had this individual capacity 
was thought by the majority to be the compelling 
reason needed for allowing the execution.209 Justice 
Stewart's analysis of the requirement of "indivi-
dualization" in the death penalty's administration 
thus allowed him to view individual waiver as a 
sufficient moral justification for imposing the death 
penalty. 
203 Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637 n.5 (1977) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
204 See N.Y. Times, April 7, 1978, § 2, at 3, col. 2. 
(where the New York gubernatorial candidate indicates 
that his opponent's opposition to the death penalty was 
a major issue in the recent campaign). 
~ N.Y. Times, July 23, 1978, at I, col. I (reporting a 
prison disturbance in Illinois in which three prison guards 
were killed). 
206 See generally Bedau, The Right to Die by Firing 
Squad-The Death Penalty and Gary Gilmore, 7 Hastings 
Center Rep. 5 (1977). 
207 429 u.s. 1012 (1976). 
208 /d. at 1018 (White, J., dissenting). 
209 /d. at 1013. 
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As the Gilmore circumstances indicate, the legal 
capacity of the offender might become the subject 
of future death penalty litigation. Almost all death 
penalty statutes list the defendant's "mental ca-
pacity" in some form as a mitigating factor.210 
However, the Court has thus far avoided deciding 
anything on this issue even though the companion 
case to Lockett, Bell v. Ohio,211 had lurking i:he 
question concerning the effect of mental capacity 
on the impositon of the death penalty. The defend-
ant in Bell was a 16-year-old boy who had been 
transferred from juvenile to adult criminal court 
court for trial for aggravated murder.212 One ques-
tion arising from Bell, not resolved by the Cou11's 
decisions, is wheter extreme youth in and of itself 
constitutes incapacity, short of insanity, so as to 
mitigate the death penalty.213 Even though the 
Court's handling of Lockett made it unnecessary to 
address this issue, it is likely to reappear.214 If the 
issue does reappear, we should expect Justices 
White and Stewart to respond in terms of their 
respective theories of responsibility and punish-
ment. 
A final point for distinguishing Justices White 
and Stewart could arise from the application of 
their two constitutional theories to emerging issues 
of sentencing. So far the Court has managed to 
avoid entering the general debate about the inad-
equacy of our prevailing sentencing practices and 
policies.215 Lower courts, however, have begun to 
struggle with the implications of the Court's death 
penalty doctrine outside of the death penalty con-
text. For instance, whether a mandatory life sen-
tence for certain drug offenders complies with the 
Coker proportionality analysis has been addressed 
and answered in the affirmative by state and fed-
eral aepellate courts.216 Were such a case before 
210 See generally Liebman & Shepart, Guiding Senteneing 
Discretion Beyond the "Boiler Plate": Mental Disorder as a 
Mitifating Factor, 66 GEo. L.J. 757 (1978). 
21 98 S. Ct. 2977 (1978). 
212 State v. Bell, 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 358 N.E.2d 556 
(1976). 
213 /d. 
214 Public concern about "violent" youthful offenders 
is beginning to influence sentencing policy recommen-
dations. See, Zimring, Pursuingjuvenilejustice: Comments on 
Some Recent Reform Proposals, 55 U. DET. J. URB. L. 631, 
637-40 (1978). 
215 In Lockett, Chief Justice Burger pointed the inap-
plicability of his analysis to the problem of mandatory 
sentencing. He emphasized "that in dealing with stan-
dards' for imposition of the death sentence we intimate 
no view regarding the authority of a State or of the 
Congress to fix mandatory, minimum sentences for non-
capital crimes." 98 S. Ct. at 2965 n.13. 
216 People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 371, N.Y.S.2d 
471, 332 N.K 2d 338, cert. denied 423 U.S. 950 (1975); 
the Supreme Court, we can anticipate some basic 
disagreement between Justices Stewart and White 
in the way they would approach the issues. A 
sentencing issue for drug offenses should rekindle 
the fundamental debate between Stewart and 
White about the role of the "rehabilitative ideal" 
in criminal law illustrated by the previous analysis 
of Robinson. Resolution ofissues such as these should 
feel the effect of these two theories.217 
Juvenile sentencing is another problem of sen-
tencing that will also feel the influence of the two 
competing theories, even if it never reaches the 
Court. At the heart of the debate over juvenile 
sentencing is the question of the viability of the 
juvenile process of adjudication as a means of 
determining the need for social control of an indi-
vidual.218 If policy makers view this problem solely 
from Justice Stewart's perspective, they might try 
to insure that the procedures provide for sufficient 
"individualization" at the dispositional phase of 
the process.219 If, on the other hand, the policy 
makers adopt Justice White's perspective, they 
would be concerned with whether the processes of 
adjudication are capable of establishing the youth's 
culpability in a manner that would justify the new 
harsher penalty.220 Asking either question about 
juvenile sentencing illustrates that legislators have 
not yet considered these approaches in their recent 
attempts to reform juvenile sentencing proce-
dures.221 
Deciding any sentencing issue requires all of us 
to think systematically about a range of interre-
lated problems and to utilize both Justices' theo-
ries. For instance, sentencing reform may require 
consideration of the extent to which "plea bargain-
ing" is permissible and the degree of "discretion" 
that a prosecutor should be given.222 Formulating 
and asking questions of this nature as we debate 
sentencing reform should force us to consider the 
criminal law as a process with component parts 
that ought, in a normative sense, function together 
in a certain matter. If a court decides that due 
process has or has not been violated in sentencing, 
we should now be aware that the court has em-
barked upon a process of telling us how the crimi-
Ward v. Carmona, 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978). 217 See discussion in Part I of text supra. 
218 See Hazard, The jurisprudence of juvenile Deviance, in 
PURSUING jUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 1976). 219 ld. at 13-14. 
220 Id. at 14. 221 See Zimring, note 214 supra. 
222 See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 
(1978) (Court upheld the prosecutors right to re-indict 
the defendant as a habitual offender after his refusal to 
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nal process functions as a system.223 This type of 
systematic analysis ought to influence the thinking 
of legislators who are currently trying to reform 
sentencing without reference to problems of sub-
stantive criminallaw.224 
CoNCLUSION 
This article has attempted to articulate more 
fully than the Justices themselves the fundamental 
differences between Justices Stewart and White. 
Their conflicting positions in particular death pen-
alty cases are logical outgrowths of their primary 
disagreement over the reach of the eighth and 
fourteenth amendments. Yet, when considering the 
proportionality of punishment to offense in a case 
considered only under the eighth amendment, like 
Coker, the two Justices are able to agree without 
ac~t a plea bargain.) 
See note 9 supra. 
221 See note 215 supra. 
repudiating their basic theories. Only when Justice 
Stewart begins to frame the issue in terms of pro-
cedural due process-"individualization"-does 
disagreement arise. For Justice White, once the 
issues of proportionality and adequacy of legisla-
tive criteria are settled, the usual procedural safe-
guards in criminal cases are adequate. In his view, 
the concept of appellate courts as central policy 
making bodies, a central tenet of Stewart's theory, 
is untenable. 
Future death penalty litigation may reflect the 
fundamental differences between the two Justices. 
Even if the Court never formally enters the debate, 
the perspectives of Justices Stewart and White are 
useful in analyzing the issues raised by the reforms 
of our present discretionary sentencing practices. It 
is to be hoped that by clarifying the nature and 
source of these competing theories, the past and 
future development of the administration of the 
death penalty will seem more rational. 
